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POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATION·s.* By
Charles R. Beitz. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1979.
Pp. ix, 212. $16.50.

To paraphrase Francis Bacon, some authors prepare tasty snacks
- small, richly flavored morsels of thought that go down easily and
leave the reader with the pleasant aftertaste of civilization. Others
produce heavier meals, feasts that must be approached with respect,
devoured in small bites, and chewed well. In Political Theory and
International Relations, Charles Beitz presents ideas that require
thorough digestion, but chops them up to disguise them as light
snacks. Unfortunately, his carving shows.
Beitz's thesis is that a normative political theory of foreign affairs
is possible. In essence, he argues that skepticism toward moral judgments in international relations (which he calls "international skepticism") must proceed from a pervasive skepticism about the place of
morality in all political theory. If moral judgments are accepted as
appropriate in domestic politics, then analogous principles can be
derived that must have equivalent force in the international sphere.
The book argues this point, then illustrates it by outlining the international analogues of John Rawls's difference principle in domestic
distributive justice.
In Part I, Beitz presents and refutes arguments in favor of international skepticism. His primary target is the view - shared by
Raymond Aron and others - that international politics is an example of Thomas Hobbes's state of nature. According to that view,
nothing exists to compel nations to comply with moral rules that
conflict with their self-interest. And without assurance of reciprocity, each nation will follow its self-interest because unilateral compliance is irrational.
Beitz identifies two flaws in the analogy between the state of nature and foreign affairs. First, empirically, the world does not seem
to fit Hobbes's mold. Unlike a person in the state of nature, a nation
is neither self-sufficient nor a unitary source of ends. Indeed, nations
are not the only significant actors in world politics: their decisions
can be influenced by transnational groups, such as large corporations. They are also subject to peaceful coercion through censure,
economic embargo, and other sanctions. Because of these weakening factors, Beitz notes that nations can have common interests and
can rationally expect mutual compliance with rules that foster those
interests. Unfortunately, Beitz fails to explain the practical importance of these expectations. If the analogy between international re* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review - Ed.
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lations and the state of nature is imperfect, then a theory of foreign
affairs derived exclusively from Hobbes is incomplete. Yet the stateof-nature model's failure to account for areas of reciprocal compliance may be either fatal or trivial, depending upon the strength of
the expectations and the range of activities in which they arise. A
gap between theory and observation does not necessarily extinguish
the value of the analogy.
Second, Beitz criticizes the analogy on theoretical grounds. Most
Hobbesian theorists assume that the survival of nations is the ultimate moral goal. Beitz rejects this assumption:
The argument that states should pursue their own interests in the
absence of reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance with common
rules depends on the analogy drawn between persons in the interpersonal state of nature and states in international relations. . . .
Those who wish to apply Hobbes's argument to international relations should say that the parties to the international state of nature,
when it is used as a device for showing which rules of conduct are
rational, are to be conceived as persons rather than as states. This state
of nature is international in the sense that the parties to it are of diverse
citizenship. But they are still persons, and their choice of rules for the
behavior of states (in such a revised Hobbesian view) is guided by their
desire to preserve themselves as persons rather than simply to preserve
their states as state. . . .
. . .[N]othing is gained, and considerable clarity is lost, by attempting to justify principles of international conduct with reference to their
effects on the interests of states. It is the rights and interests of persons
that are of fundamental importance from the moral point of view, and
it is to these considerations that the justification of principles for international relations should appeal. [Pp. 51-55.]

Again, Beitz criticizes international skepticism without explaining
why his criticism is important. He does not describe circumstances
in which a citizen's conception of his individual self-interest diverges
from his conception of the national interest. To the extent that these
two interests are identified with each other, Betiz amends the analogy in a minor detail, but does not destroy its probative value.
Having rejected international skepticism, at least in its purest
form, Beitz struggles to give substance to his international moral
principles. In Part II, he attacks the second most popular formulation of international political theory, which he calls "morality of
states." This theory, traced to the writings of Samuel Pufendorf and
others, also draws an analogy between nations and people. Unlike
international skepticism, however, it concludes that nations have a
right of autonomy that insulates them from external moral criticism
and political interference. Thus, nations have rights of self-determination, free from foreign intervention and economic imperialism.
Beitz argues that the morality of states analogy is also flawed. He
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contends that a state's claim to national autonomy is only justified
when it respects the autonomy of its citizens. "[T]he claim that unjust states should not be accorded the respect demanded by the principle of state autonomy follows from the claim that it is only
considerations of personal autonomy, appropriately interpreted, that
constitute the moral personality of the state" (p. 81 ).
Beitz next outlines his own theory, drawing heavily on John
Rawls. He begins with unborn parties in a hypothetical "original
position"who know they must cooperate to produce goods and services. They do not know their nationalities, their roles, their abilities,
or their proximity to natural resources. Their task is to agree on
principles to govern the distribution of goods and services. Beitz argues that they would conform to Rawls's "difference principle,"
agreeing to depart from perfect equality only when the departure
would increase the total benefits received by the least advantaged
person. Such a global difference principle has important implications for the allocation of natural resources:
In the case of natural resources the parties to the international original position would know that resources are unevenly distributed with
respect to population, that adequate access to resource is a prerequisite
for successful operation of (domestic) cooperative schemes, and that
resources are scarce. They would view the natural distribution of resources as arbitrary in the sense that no one has a natural prima facie
claim to the resources that happen to be under one's feet. The appropriation of scarce resources by some requires a justification against the
competing claims of others and the needs of future generations. Not
knowing the resource endowments of their own societies, the parties
would agree on a resource redistribution principle that would give each
society a fair chance to develop just political institutions and an economy capable of satisfying its members' basic needs. [P. 141.]

A new perspective on foreign aid emerges from this global difference
principle:
.
Once the existence of global redistributive obligations founded on justice is recognized, however, the view of aid as charity must be given up.
It is inappropriate to regard foreign assistance as discretionary in the
way charitable contributions are, nor can the attachment of political
conditions be easily defended . . . . Furthermore, one cannot acknowledge a duty of justice to contribute to economic development
elsewhere without acknowledging that existing legal property rights
lack a firm moral foundation. Aid should not be regarded as a voluntary contribution of a portion of a state's own wealth, but rather as a
transfer of wealth to redress distributive injustice. [Pp. 172-73.]

Political Theory and International Relations is frequently provocative. Beitz points out, for instance, that definitions of impermissible
foreign intervention are oversimplified. If the goal is to protect individuals' autonomy (a goal usually served by nonintervention), then
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intervention may be justified if it reforms a society's unjust institutions. Thus, a complete ban on intervention is unjustified.
Despite its insights, however, the book remains frustrating. Beitz
resembles a professor who attempts to explain a thousand years of
Western civilization in sixty minutes; 183 pages cannot accommodate his many intricate ideas. Surely Locke deserves more than a
few scattered paragraphs (pp. 59, 60, 78-79), and Rousseau more
than a few footnotes (p. 33 n.47, p. 45 n.75, p. 62 n.106). A measured
pace and a longer book would have provided more satisfactory reading.
Moreover, Beitz wanders from his mission. He sets out "to work
out a more satisfactory international normative political theory" (p.
vii), yet the reader suffers through the first two thirds of the book
waiting for him to get started. During this initial period, the author
laborio~sly develops the more general and less interesting proposition that some kind of international political theory based on individual autonomy is possible. Sadly, he squanders most of his energy
defending that proposition in abbreviated battles with Morgenthau,
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Grotius, Wolff, and a host of other opponents.
When he reaches Rawls's theory, he is too tired to argue its wisdom
on the merits. He professes only to "explore the relevance of Rawls's
view for international relations" (p. 129). Even this modest exploration quietly trails off into a few comments on the nature of foreign
aid.
Beitz establishes that nations can rationally rely on compliance
with rules in some areas. Recent world events, however, are a reminder of the fragility of such patterns of reliance. Perhaps the author's failure to elaborate upon his international principles stems
from the futility of attempting to do so. If these principles exist, but
are weak and limited in scope, then Hobbes is correct in result and
Beitz only adds a scholarly clarification to his theory. Are international moral principles trivial1 Without more analysis, one cannot
know.

